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INTRODUCTION 
In his opening brief, the Debtor1 asks this Court to establish a bright line rule for 
determining whether a nonqualified Keogh plan is, nevertheless, "described in Section 
401(a)" of the Internal Revenue Code within the meaning of the Utah exemption statute. 
The Debtor's proposed rule is that, if plan defaults can be corrected under the IRS' 
EPCRS program, then the plan is "described in Section 401(a)," regardless of whether (or 
when) the defaults have been corrected under that program, ^nd even where, as is the 
case here, the Debtor has made no attempt to correct the plan defaults. This proposed 
rule, however, finds no support in the plain language of the Utah exemption statute, its 
legislative history or any legitimate policy considerations. 
Thus, the Debtor is left only with the argument that exemption statutes should be 
liberally construed in favor of debtors. However, no amount of liberal construction can 
change the fact that the only plans "described in Section 401(a)" are plans that are 
qualified under § 401(a). Moreover, as will be shown below, the Debtor's argument that 
this proper interpretation of the Utah exemption statute could result in countless debtors 
losing their retirement funds is not true. 
Thus, this Court should determine that the only plans "described in Section 
401(a)" are plans qualified under § 401(a), as the Utah legislature clearly intended. 
Defined terms used herein generally have the same meaning as in the Trustee's opening 
brief. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
I. A KEOGH PLAN THAT IS NOT QUALIFED UNDER 
SECTION 401(a) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE IS 
NOT "DESCRIBED IN SECTION 401(a)" 
In the summary of arguments, at p. 7 of the Debtor's opening brief, he argues: 
'The question before this Court is whether a retirement plan that is operationally in 
default as of the bankruptcy filing date can nevertheless be 'described in' the Utah 
exemption statute." (Emphasis added.) That is not the question before this Court. The 
question that the Tenth Circuit certified to this Court is: "Can a Keogh plan be 'described 
in' section 401(a) of the IRC despite failing to fulfill that section's requirements for 
qualification, thereby entitling debtor to exempt the plan from his bankruptcy estate 
property?" (Emphasis added.) Moreover, as discussed on p. 4 of the Trustee's opening 
brief, the Tenth Circuit rejected the Debtor's request that it rewrite the certified question 
in the fashion stated in the Debtor's summary of arguments. 
As demonstrated in the Trustee's opening brief, under the plain language of the 
Utah exemption statute and 26 U.S.C. § 401(a), the only plans "described in" § 401(a) are 
plans that are qualified under § 401(a). Plans that fail to fulfill § 401(a)'s requirements 
for tax qualification are plans that are not described in § 401(a). Any other interpretation 
makes the Utah statute's reference to § 401(a) meaningless. 
As also demonstrated in the Trustee's opening brief, the legislative history of the 
Utah exemption statute shows that the Utah legislature intended to exempt only Keogh 
plans that are qualified under § 401(a) in order to make Utah exemption law consistent 
with federal tax law. As further argued in the Trustee's opening brief, at pp. 15-16, the 
2 
most likely reason that the Utah legislature chose the "described in" language, rather than 
"qualified under" language, is because not all of the ten Internal Revenue Code sections 
referenced in the Utah statute have qualification requirements. 
Thus, the Debtor's argument that the legislature intended to exempt non-qualified 
Keogh plans, if their operational defects can be corrected under EPCRS, regardless of 
whether (or when) the defects have been corrected, and even where, as with the Debtor 
here, no attempt has been made to correct the defects, is contradicted by both the plain 
language of the Utah statute and its legislative history. As argued in the Trustee's 
opening brief, liberal construction is not a license for this Court to rewrite the Utah 
statute or to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the Utah legislature.2 
Other than liberal construction, the Debtor's only argument for interpreting the 
"described in Section 401(a)" language of the Utah statute as broader than "qualified 
under § 401(a)" is based on the bankruptcy court decision in the Kaplan case. See First 
Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan {In re Kaplan), 162 B.R. 684 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993), 
affd., Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 189 B.R. 882 (E.D. Pa. 1995), rehearing 
den., First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 198 B.R. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1996). However, as 
argued in the Trustee's opening brief, the Debtor misreads that decision (as did the 
bankruptcy court here). Moreover, the subsequent appellate history of Kaplan confirms 
that the bankruptcy court's holding in Kaplan, as affirmed by the district court, was that 
the "provided for under section 401(a)" language of the Pennsylvania exemption statute 
means nothing more than "qualified under § 401(a)," just as the "described in Section 
The Trustee will address the Debtor's liberal construction arguments more fully below. 
3 
401(a)" language of the Utah exemption statute means nothing more than "qualified 
under § 401(a)."3 
In Kaplan v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 189 B.R. 882 (E.D. Pa. 1995), the 
district court affirmed the bankruptcy court decision in Kaplan but disagreed with the 
bankruptcy court's dictum that the "provided for under" language in the Pennsylvania 
exemption statute is broader than qualified under. The district court described the 
bankruptcy court decision as follows: 
The bankruptcy court premised its finding that the Plan is 
exempt under Pennsylvania law upon the IRS determination 
that the Plan was tax qualified, and upon the condition that 
the Plan will continue to enjoy its tax qualified status. 
189 B.R. at 889 (footnote omitted). 
The district court then noted that the bankruptcy court's view was that tax 
qualification may be unnecessary under the Pennsylvania statute and indicated that the 
district court would not review that portion of the bankruptcy court decision. Id. 
Nevertheless, the district court did review that portion of the bankruptcy court decision, 
construed the decision as requiring that a § 401(a) plan be tax qualified in order to be 
exempt under the Pennsylvania statute, and affirmed that construction.4 
J
 The Trustee apologizes to this Court for not citing or explaining Kaplan's subsequent 
appellate history in his opening brief. Kaplan's subsequent appellate history was cited, 
but not explained, in the Trustee's reply brief in the Tenth Circuit (on file in this Court). 
However, the Debtor also did not cite or explain Kaplan's subsequent appellate history in 
either the Debtor's opening brief in this Court, or in his Tenth Circuit brief (also on file in 
this Court). 
4
 At p. 10, n. 7, of his opening brief here, the Debtor argues that "many courts have held 
that an ERISA qualified retirement plans[sic] need not be 'tax qualified' in order to be 
excluded from the bankruptcy estate," and cites four cases in support of that argument. 
4 
The district court began its analysis as follows: 
Our initial inquiry will focus on the underlying principle that 
the Plan must be "tax-qualified" under I.R.C. § 401(a) in 
order to be "qualified" under the Pennsylvania statute. We 
begin by focusing on the plain language of the statute and 
note that it exempts only "fund[s] provided for under section 
401(a). . . of the Internal Revenue Code." 42Pa.C.S. § 
8124(b)(l)(ix). Language such as "provided for under" 
seems to indicate that in order to establish a valid exemption 
under the Pennsylvania statute, the pension plan would have 
to comport with I.R.C. § 401(a). Thus, the Pennsylvania 
statute seemingly requires a plan to be tax qualified in order 
to be exempt for bankruptcy purposes. 
Id. at 890 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). The court then noted that there was some 
legislative history that could cast doubt on this "plain language" interpretation. Id. 
Ultimately, however, the court concluded: 
Nevertheless, . . . despite the bankruptcy court's reservations 
concerning the need for the Plan to meet the requirements of 
I.R.C. § 401(a) in order to be qualified under Pennsylvania 
law, its decision was, in substance, based upon two IRS 
determinations that the Plan was tax qualified. Consequently, 
it appears that. . . the bankruptcy court and this Court agree 
that the Plan should be tax qualified in order to be exempt 
from the bankruptcy estate. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
Like the bankruptcy court, the district court then deferred to the IRS, which had 
issued two favorable tax qualification letters, in May 1985 and September 1986. Id. at 
The Debtor made that same argument and cited the same four cases at p. 11, n. 1, of his 
Tenth Circuit brief (on file in this Court). That argument and those cases are addressed in 
the Trustee's opening brief here at p. 19, n. 20, pointing out that the property of the estate 
issue is different than the exemption issue and is a non-issue here. The property of the 
estate issue is addressed further below in response to the Debtor's argument that 
countless debtors will lose their retirement funds if "described in Section 401(a)" means 
the same thing as qualified under § 401(a). 
5 
886, 890-91. In doing so, the district court relied on the Fifth Circuit decision in 
Youngblood v. F.DJ.C (In re Youngblood), 29 F.3d 225 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that, in 
enacting its exemption statute, the Texas legislature intended that courts would defer to 
the IRS in determining whether a retirement plan is qualified under § 401(a)). However, 
the Fifth Circuit later distinguished and declined to follow Youngblood in Plunk v. 
Yaquinto (In re Plunk), 481 F.3d 302 (5th Cir. 2007) which held that "when disqualifying 
events occur after the IRS has last determined that a plan is qualified, a court may, under 
[the Texas exemption statute] determine that a plan is no longer qualified based on those 
events." Id. at 307. See also Dzikowski v. Blais (In re Blais), 220 B.R. 485, 489 (S.D. 
Fla. 1997) (reaching a similar result under Florida law). 
Any doubt about what the district court held in Kaplan was eliminated by the 
district court's subsequent decision in that case denying a petition for rehearing. See 
First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 198 B.R. 91 (E.D. Pa. 1996). There, the district 
court stated: 
In our original Opinion, this Court determined that the 
language of the Pennsylvania exemption statute required a 
plan to be tax-qualified in order for it to be found exempt 
under this statute. 
Id. at 93 (emphasis added). 
Thus, just as the plain language "provided for under section 401(a)" of the 
Pennsylvania exemption statute means qualified under § 401(a), the plain language 
"described in Section 401(a)" of the Utah exemption statute also means qualified under 
§ 401(a). In addition, as shown in the Trustee's opening brief, unlike the legislative 
6 
history of the Pennsylvania statute, the legislative history of the Utah statute supports this 
plain language interpretation. 
As shown above and in the Trustee's opening brief, the Debtor's opening brief, at 
pp. 10-11, misinterprets the bankruptcy court's decision in Kaplan and ignores the two 
subsequent district court decisions in that case, as well as the Fifth Circuit's decision in 
Plunk. At p. 11 of his opening brief, the Debtor argues that "like the retirement plan in 
Kaplan, the Plan [here] has not been disqualified by the IRS and all of the operational 
defaults are correctable."5 Under Plunk, the fact that the IRS has not disqualified the 
Debtor's plan is irrelevant, and the bankruptcy court and Tenth Circuit properly 
determined that the Debtor's plan was not qualified under § 401(a). While the 
bankruptcy court in Kaplan noted that "the main [plan] deficiencies alleged are curable," 
162 B.R. at 698, and the district court (in its original decisiort) discussed the IRS' 
Voluntary Compliance Resolution Program (i.e., the VCP aspect of EPCRS), 189 B.R. at 
891, these matters did not dissuade the district court from interpreting the Pennsylvania 
statute as exempting only plans that are qualified under § 401(a).6 
It is not accurate to say that "all of the operational defaults are correctable." The 
bankruptcy court found only that the defaults about which Mr. Lloyd testified were 
correctable (Add. B to the Trustee's opening brief, Aplt. App. DLG 00046-00047). Mr. 
Lloyd did not opine about the Debtor's failure to cause his PC to adopt the alleged Keogh 
Plan in 1996, which disqualified the plan because it was no lpnger maintained by an 
employer, as required by § 401(a). See the Trustee's opening brief, p. 7, n. 9. 
Nevertheless, this issue was raised in the pretrial order in the bankruptcy court and 
argued by the Trustee in his hearing brief there. (Aplt. App. DLG00022, ^ i, DLG 
00072-00073). However, the Debtor put on no evidence that this default was correctable. 
6
 The district court also was not dissuaded by the bankruptcy court's ''recognition that 
the issues are technical and close ones and that, when there i]s a significant doubt about 
7 
Moreover, the Debtor is in no position to argue that his non-qualified plan is 
"described in Section 401(a)" because his plan defaults are correctable under EPCRS, 
where he has made no effort to correct them.7 At p. 13, n. 8, of the Debtor's opening 
brief, he states: "EPCRS is based on the following principles: plan sponsors should be 
allowed to make 'voluntary and timely correction of plan failures;' and 'plan sponsors 
should be able to rely on the availability of EPCRS in taking corrective action to maintain 
the tax-favored status of their plans.'" (Citing Rev. Proc. 2006-27, § 102, some emphasis 
added by the Debtor, some added by the Trustee.) 
The Debtor has made no "voluntary" or "timely" correction of his plan's failures. 
In apparent recognition of this unfavorable fact, the Debtor complains, at p. 4, f 3, of his 
opening brief, that the Trustee did not identify the specifics of the Debtor's plan defaults 
until October, 2006. Of course, however, the Debtor has been aware since the Trustee 
filed his objection to exemption ten years ago that the Debtor's plan "may not be 
qualified." (Aplt. App. DLG00012-00014.) He was familiar with the operation of his 
own plan but fails to explain why he took no "voluntary and timely" action to identify 
and correct his plan's operational defaults during the over six year period before October 
2006 (such as by hiring a CPA or an attorney, like Mr. Lloyd, or even conducting 
discovery in the bankruptcy proceeding). He also does not explain why he failed to 
the outcome of such a matter, 'liberal interpretation of exemption laws are favored.'" 
162 B.R. at 698 (emphasis added, citations omitted). 
7
 As discussed above, the bankruptcy court did find that the plan defaults Mr. Lloyd 
testified about were correctable. The court did not rule that correctable defaults equate 
with "described in Section 401(a)." (Add. B to the Trustee's opening brief.) 
8 
undertake "voluntary and timely correction of plan failures" for almost four years after he 
o 
admits learning of the specifics of his plan's operational defaults. 
The Debtor repeatedly argues that his plan violations are technical only9 and, at p. 
6, Tf 7, of his opening brief, he cites Mr. Lloyd's testimony in support of that proposition. 
However, Mr. Lloyd also testified that these violations are setious enough that they could 
not be self-corrected without IRS involvement under the SCFJ aspect of EPCRS, and 
instead would have to be corrected under the VCP aspect of the program, requiring the 
Debtor to admit his plan was non-qualified as of the petition date, pay a fee, and obtain 
IRS approval of remedial measures. (Aplt. App. DLG00231-[00233; see also Rev. Proc. 
2006-27, § 10,1.R.B. 2006-22.) 
With respect to the Debtor's failure to include his wif$, Janet, in the plan, Mr. 
Lloyd estimated that the Debtor would have to pay about $30,000 to make up for his 
missing contributions on her behalf. (Aplt. App. DLG00248^00251.) Unless and until 
the Debtor goes to the IRS to seek approval to correct his plah violations, his ability to 
obtain that approval is theoretical only. 
An interpretation of "described in Section 401(a)" that would exempt plans which 
have correctable, but uncorrected, operational defects is also contrary to public policy. 
o 
It is evident that the Debtor will not attempt to take advantage of EPCRS unless he is 
forced to. However, because the Debtor's correction of plan | failures must be "voluntary 
and timely," if he waits until the IRS audits his plan before attempting to take advantage 
of EPCRS, he will have to attempt to use the Closing Agreement Program, under which 
"the amount of the sanction goes up substantially." (Aplt. A£p. DLG00230-DLG00231.) 
9
 The Debtor is confused about whether the Parker Loan represents "three percent of the 
total contributions to the Plan" (Debtor's opening brief, pp. 6-7, emphasis added.) or 
"only 3% of the Plan's assets," (Debtor's opening brief, p. 1$, emphasis added). 
9 
Such an interpretation would encourage and allow debtors to ignore the requirements of 
the Internal Revenue Code, hope they do not get audited, and in the meantime shield the 
assets in their nonqualified plans from creditors. This Court should not permit such a 
result. 
II. THE DEBTOR'S LIBERAL CONSTRUCTION ARGUMENTS 
ARE UNAVAILING 
The Debtor's only remaining argument is that exemption statutes should be 
liberally construed to prevent debtors from becoming public charges. It is ironic that the 
Debtor would make this argument where he failed to include his wife, Janet, as a 
participant in the plan and make contributions on her behalf (as required by law), thereby 
making it more likely that she could become a public charge. 
The primary liberal construction case the Debtor relies on is In re Kunz, 2004 UT 
71, 99 P.3d 793. However, Kunz makes it clear that liberal construction is a default rule 
to be used only if legislative intent cannot be determined from the plain language of the 
statute, its legislative history, or relevant policy considerations. Id. at ^ 8. As shown 
above, the plain language of the Utah exemption statute (as aided by the bankruptcy 
court's and district court's interpretation, in Kaplan, of similar language in the 
Pennsylvania exemption statute), its legislative history, and relevant policy 
considerations, all show that the legislative intent was only to exempt qualified § 401(a) 
plans and certainly not to exempt non-qualified plans with correctable, but not corrected, 
operational defaults. 
10 
Kunz notes that there is a public policy to "[provide] debtors with sufficient 
support to prevent them from becoming public charges," 2004 UT 71, Tj 10 (citation 
omitted). However, as argued above, that policy should not be used to encourage debtors 
not to remedy their retirement plans' violations of federal tax| law, as the Debtor here 
proposes. 
As part of his liberal construction argument, the Debtor asks this Court to: 
. . . imagine if the Trustee's interpretation werej imposed on 
all debtors in the State of Utah: countless debtors who 
participate in retirement plans would be at risk to lose their 
retirement funds if, as of the date of their bankruptcy filing, 
their employer had failed to include just one employee from 
participating in the retirement plan. Such a resiilt is easily 
foreseeable, especially where larger employers! are required to 
administer plans involving hundreds or thousands of 
employees. 
Debtor's opening brief, p. 14 (emphasis added). The Debtors use of the word "imagine" 
is apt because this argument is only a product of his imagination. As explained below, 
the proper interpretation of "described in Section 401(a)" as synonymous with "qualified 
under § 401(a)" will only affect retirement plans whose only! participants are either a self-
employed individual, or that individual and his or her spous0. 
Like most retirement plans, the Debtor's plan is a self-settled spendthrift trust, i.e., 
a trust in which the settlor and beneficiary are the same person, and which contains an 
anti-alienation provision prohibiting the beneficiary from transferring (and creditors from 
reaching) trust assets. (Aplt. App. DLG00134, § 12.3.) See In re Kerr, 65 B.R. 739, 744-
45 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986). Under most state law (including Utah law), anti-alienation 
11 
provisions in self-settled trusts are not enforceable against creditors. Id. (citing Utah case 
law); see also McGoldrick v. Walker, 838 P.2d 1139 (Utah 1992).10 
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 541, governs what property of 
the debtor is also property of the debtor's bankruptcy estate. Section 541(c)(2) provides 
that "[a] restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the debtor in a trust that is 
enforceable under nonbankruptcy law is enforceable in a case under this title." Under 
this provision, a debtor's assets in a self-settled spendthrift trust are not property of the 
bankruptcy estate if the anti-alienation provision is "enforceable under nonbankruptcy 
law." 
Until 1992, there was a split in the federal circuit courts of appeal over whether the 
term "nonbankruptcy law" means only state law, or whether it also includes federal law 
such as ERISA. As indicated above, if the term "nonbankruptcy law" means only state 
law, then, in Utah and most other states, anti-alienation provisions in self-settled trusts 
are not enforceable, so that assets in a self-settled spendthrift trust are reachable by 
creditors and, thus, are property of the bankruptcy estate. On the other hand, if the term 
"nonbankruptcy law" includes ERISA, then the anti-alienation provisions in self-settled 
trusts are enforceable under Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1), which 
requires ERISA pension plans to contain an anti-alienation provision (that therefore is 
enforceable under ERISA). 
10
 Although some of the Utah cases were decided under a section of the fraudulent 
conveyance statutes, which have been repealed and replaced by the Utah Fraudulent 
Transfer Act, these cases indicate that the statute was merely a codification of the 
common law. See, e.g., McGoldrick, 838 P.2d at 1141 (citing Leach v. Anderson, 535 
P.2dl241, 1244 (Utah 1975)). 
12 
In 1992, this issue was resolved by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in 
Patterson v. Shumate, 504 U.S. 753 (1992), holding that the term "applicable non-
bankruptcy law" includes ERISA and other federal law. Later, the U.S. Supreme Court 
also clarified that ERISA covers pension plans maintained b>j self-employed individuals 
because they are treated by ERISA not only as employers bu1] also as employees, but only 
if the participants in the plan include more employees than just the self-employed 
individual and his or her spouse. See Raymond B. Yates, M.IJ}., P.C. Profit Sharing Plan 
v.Hendon,541U.S. 1(2004). 
Thus, under Patterson and Yates, and contrary to the debtor's argument at p. 14 of 
his opening brief, the fact that a retirement plan may not be tax qualified because of the 
employer's failure to operate the plan within the requirement^ of § 401(a) will not result 
in thousands of workers losing their retirement plans. Such p l^ans are covered by ERISA 
and are unreachable by creditors because of an enforceable spendthrift provision. As a 
result, the assets of these plans are not property of the bankruptcy estate and it is 
irrelevant whether or not these assets are exempt. 
As the bankruptcy court correctly ruled here, it is onl){ the assets of plans like the 
Debtor's alleged Keogh plan here, where the self-employed (tiebtor is the only participant 
(or where the only participants are the self-employed debtor ftnd his or her spouse, as 
should have been the case here) that are property of the estate. Therefore, only these 
plans must face the exemption issue because, under Yates, they are not covered under 
ERISA (sometimes referred to in the case law, including Yatys, as not being "ERISA 
qualified"), and their spendthrift provisions are unenforceable under Utah law. 
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Thus, what the "described in Section 401(a)" language of the Utah exemption 
statutes means, and what this Court should hold, is that where a retirement plan is not 
ERISA qualified (because it covers only a self-employed debtor or that debtor and his or 
her spouse), it must be tax qualified in order to avoid claims of creditors.11 This is as it 
should be because such plans (like the Debtor's plan here) typically are not administered 
by third parties, but by the debtor, in his capacity as a self-employer, who should bear 
responsibility for his own failure to operate the plan so as to maintain its tax qualified 
status. 
The foregoing analysis also gives rise to another public policy concern, discussed 
above, that, in Utah and most other states, spendthrift provisions in self-settled trusts are 
not enforceable because such provisions are a vehicle by which to hide assets from 
creditors. Cf. Kurtz, supra, 2004 UT 71, ^ 11 (recognizing a "policy . . . to prevent 
debtors from using retirement accounts to shield funds from their creditors" (citation 
omitted)). The "described in Section 401(a)" language of the Utah exemption statute 
balances this policy, with the policy behind exemption statutes to prevent debtors from 
becoming public charges, by allowing spendthrift clauses in self-settled retirement trusts 
to be enforced, but only if the self-employed debtor (whose plan, again, does not cover 
participants other than the debtor or the debtor and his spouse) maintains the retirement 
This analysis applies to all creditor claims, whether inside or outside of bankruptcy, 
contrary to the Debtor's argument, at pp. 14-15 of his opening brief, that the Trustee is 
seeking 'a windfall merely by reason of the happenstance of bankruptcy' (quoting 
Patterson), 
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12 trust's tax qualification. 
In sum, the Debtor's liberal construction argument, afld any policy behind it to 
prevent debtors from becoming public charges, are insufficient to overcome the plain 
language of the Utah exemption statute, its legislative history, and public policies (1) 
against allowing and encouraging debtors to ignore the tax l^ws, and (2) against allowing 
plans that cover only a self-employed participant, or that participant and his or her 
spouse, to shield the participants' assets from creditors, in a $elf-settled spendthrift trust, 
unless the participant maintains the trust as tax qualified. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, and as argued in the Trustee's opening brief, this Court 
should determine that because the Debtor's alleged Keogh plan was not qualified under 
At p. 17 of the Debtor's opening brief, he argues that his operational defaults were 
correctable post-petition and cites three cases in support of that argument (or related 
arguments). He made that same argument and cited those sa^ne three cases in his Tenth 
Circuit brief (on file in this Court), and the Trustee distinguished each of those three 
cases on pp. 22-23, n. 26, of his opening brief here. As also discussed in the Trustee's 
opening brief here, whether property is exempt is determined based on the status of that 
property on the petition date. See In re Lawrence, 235 B.R. 498, 509 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 
1999), vacated on other grounds, 244 B.R. 868 (S.D. Fla. 2000). Lawrence is also 
instructive with respect to the Debtor's arguments that his operational defaults are 
technical only, and are curable under EPCRS. There, the debtor's plan was nonqualified 
because, after adopting it, the debtor failed to timely restate it to bring it into compliance 
with subsequent changes to the tax laws. After his bankruptcy filing, he sought to enter 
into a closing agreement with the IRS (part of the EPCRS program, as discussed above) 
under which he could correct his plan's deficiencies without (triggering adverse tax 
consequences, after paying certain penalties and fees. The cburt rejected the debtor's 
argument that the effect of avoiding the adverse tax consequences would mean that the 
plan was effectively tax qualified as of the petition date. 235 B.R. at 509-510. The court 
concluded by observing: "A little neglect may breed mischief. In this case, it cost the 
debtor his claim to an exemption for the interest in this pension plan." Id. at 511. The 
same holds true with respect to the Debtor here. 
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§401(a) of the Internal Revenue Code on the petition date, the plan was not a plan 
"described in Section 401(a)" within the meaning of former Utah Code Ann. § 78-23-
5(l)(a)(x) (2000) and, therefore, was not exempt. 
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